I published the following diary on isc.sans.org: “Another webshell, another backdoor!“. I’m still busy to follow how webshells are evolving… I recently found another backdoor in another webshell called “cor0.idâ€. The best place to find webshells remind pastebin.com[1]. When I’m testing a webshell, I copy it in a VM located
FSEC 2017 Wrap-Up Day #2
Here we go with a quick wrap-up of the second day. It started smoothly around 09:00 and was dedicated to more technical talks. After some refill of coffee, I was ready to follow all talks presented in the main track.
FSEC 2017 Wrap-Up Day #1
There are more and more infosec events worldwide and it’s always nice to attend new events and meet new people. This time, it is the case with FSEC. First visit to this security conference organized in Varazdin, Croatia. I had the honor to be invited as a speaker. This is already
Interesting List of Windows Processes Killed by Malicious Software
Just a quick blog post about an interesting sample that I found today. Usually, modern pieces of malware implement anti-debugging and anti-VM techniques. They perform some checks against the target and when a positive result is found, they silently exit… Such checks might be testing the screen resolution, the activity
[SANS ISC] AutoIT based malware back in the wild
I published the following diary on isc.sans.org: “AutoIT based malware back in the wild“. One week ago I wrote a diary with an analysis of a malicious RAR archive that contained an AutoIT script. The technique was not new but I was curious to see if this was a one-shot
[SANS ISC] Malicious AutoIT script delivered in a self-extracting RAR file
I published the following diary on isc.sans.org: “Malicious AutoIT script delivered in a self-extracting RAR file“. Here is another sample that hit my curiosity. As usual, the infection vector was an email which delivered some HTML code in an attached file called “PO_5634_780.docx.html†(SHA1:d2158494e1b9e0bd85e56e431cbbbba465064f5a). It has a very low VT
[SANS ISC] Malicious script dropping an executable signed by Avast?
I published the following diary on isc.sans.org: “Malicious script dropping an executable signed by Avast?“. Yesterday, I found an interesting sample that I started to analyze… It reached my spam trap attached to an email in Portuguese with the subject: “Venho por meio desta solicitar orçamento dos produtos†(“I hereby
[SANS ISC] Defang all the things!
I published the following diary on isc.sans.org: “Defang all the things!“. Today, I would like to promote a best practice via a small Python module that is very helpful when you’re dealing with suspicious or malicious URLs. Links in documents are potentially dangerous because users can always click by mistake
Who’s Blocked by Bad Guys?
Just a quick post about an interesting file found in a phishing kit. Bad guys use common techniques to prevent crawlers, scanners or security companies from accessing their pages. Usually, they deploy a .htaccess file to achieve this. Today, I found a phishing kit related to a bank (ANZ) with such
[SANS ISC] Maldoc with auto-updated link
I published the following diary on isc.sans.org: “Maldoc with auto-updated link“. Yesterday, while hunting, I found another malicious document that (ab)used a Microsoft Word feature: auto-update of links. This feature is enabled by default for any newly created document (that was the case for my Word 2016 version). If you