Hackers in the Box

HITB Amsterdam 2017 Day #1 Wrap-Up

I’m back in Amsterdam for the 8th edition of the security conference Hack in the Box. Last year, I was not able to attend but I’m attending it for a while (you can reread all my wrap-up’s here). What to say? It’s a very strong organisation, everything running fine, a good team dedicated to attendees. This year, the conference was based on four(!) tracks: two regular ones, one dedicated to more “practical” presentations (HITBlabs) and the last one dedicated to small talks (30-60 mins).

Elly van den Heuvel opened the conference with a small 15-minutes introduction talk: “How prepared we are for the future?”. Elly works for the Dutch government as the “Cyber Security Council“. She gave some facts about the current security landscape from the place of women in infosec (things are changing slowly) to the message that cyber-security is important for our security in our daily life. For Elly, we are facing a revolution as big as the one we faced with the industrial revolution, maybe even bigger. Our goal as information security professional is to build a cyber security future for the next generations. They are already nice worldwide initiatives like the CERT’s or NIST and their guidelines. In companies, board members must take their responsibilities for cyber-security projects (budgets & times must be assigned to them). Elly declared the conference officially open 🙂

The first-day keynote was given by Saumil Shah. The title was “Redefining defences”. He started with a warning: this talk is disrupting and… it was! Saumil started with a step by to the past and how security/vulnerabilities evolved. It started with servers and today people are targeted. For years, we have implemented several layers of defence but with the same effect: all of them can be bypassed. Keep in mind that there will be always new vulnerabilities because products and applications have more and more features, are becoming more complex. I really liked the comparison with the Die Hard movie: It’s the Nakatomi building: we can walk through all the targets exactly in the movie when Bruce Willis travels in the building. Vendors invent new technologies to mitigate the exploits. There was a nice reference to the “Mitigator“. The next part of the keynote was focusing how the CISO daily job and the fight against auditors. A fact: “compliance is not security”. In 2001, the CIO position was split in CIO & CISO but budgets remained assigned to the CIA as “business enabler”. Today, we should have another split: The CISO position must be divided in CISO and COO (Compliance Officer). His/her job is to defend against auditors. It was a great keynote but the audience should be more C-level people instead of “technical people” who already agree on all the facts reviewed by Saumil. [Saumil’s slides are available here]

After the first coffee break, I had to choose between two tracks. My first choice was already difficult: hacking femtocell devices or IBM mainframes running z/OS. Even if the second focused on less known environments, mainframes are used in many critical operations so I decided to attend this talk. Ayoub Elaassal is a pentester who focused on this type of targets. People still have an old idea of mainframes. The good old IBM 370 was a big success. Today, the reality is different, modern mainframes are badass computers like the IBM zEC 13: 10TB of memory, 141 processors, cryptographic chips, etc. Who uses such computers? Almost every big companies from airlines, healthcare, insurance or finance ( Have a look at this nice gallery of mainframe consoles). Why? Because it’s powerful and stable. Many people (me first) don’t know a lot about mainframes: It’s not a web app, it uses a 3270 emulator over port 23 but we don’t know how it works. On top of the mainframe OS, IBM has an application layer called CICS (“Customer Information Control System”). For Ayoub, it looks like “a combination of Tomcat & Drupal before it was cool”. CICS is a very nice target because it is used a log: Ayoub gave a nice comparison: worldwide, 1.2M of request/sec are performed using the CICS product while Google reaches 200K requests/sec. Impressive! Before exploiting CICS, the first step was to explain how it works. The mainframe world is full of acronyms. not easy to understand immediately.  But then Ayoub explained how it abused a mainframe. The first attack was to jailbreak the CICS to get a console access (just like finding the admin web page). Mainframes contain a lot of juicy information. The next attack was to read sensitive files. Completed too! So, the next step is to pwn the device. CICS has a feature called “spool” functions. A spool is a dataset (or file) containing the output of a job. Idea: generate a dataset and send it to the job scheduler. Ayoub showed a demo of a Reverse shell in REXX. Like DC trust, you can have the same trust between mainframes and push code to another one. Replace NODE(LOCAL) by NODE(WASHDC). If the spool feature is not enabled, there are alternative techniques that were also reviewed. Finally, let’s to privileges escalation: They are three main levels: Special, Operations and Audit. Special can be considered as the “root” level. Those levels are defined by a simple bit in memory. If you can swap it, you get more privileges. It was the last example. From a novice point of view, this was difficult to follow but basically, mainframes can be compromised like any other computer. The more dangerous aspect is that people using mainframes think that they’re not targeted. Based on the data stored on them, they are really nice targets. All the Ayoub’s scripts are here. [Ayoub’s slides are available here]

The next talk was “Can’t Touch This: Cloning Any Android HCE Contactless Card” by Slawomir Jasek. Cloning things has always been a dream for people. And they succeeded in 1996 with Dolly the sheep. Later, in 2001, scientists make “Copycat”. Today we have also services to clone pets (if you have a lot of money to spend). Even if cloning humans is unethical, it remains a dream. So, we not close also objects? Especially if it can help to get some money. Mobile contactless payment cards are a good target. It’s illegal but bad guys don’t care. Such devices implement a lot of countermeasures but are we sure that they can’t be bypassed? Slawomir explained briefly the HCE technology. So, what are the different ways to abuse a payment application? The first one is of course to stole the phone. We can steal the card data via NFC (but they are already restriction: the phone screen must be turned on). We can’t pay but for motivated people, it should be possible to rebuild the mag stripe. Mobile apps use tokenization. Random card numbers are generated to pay and are used only for such operations. The transaction is protected by encrypted data. So, the next step is to steal the key. Online? Using man-in-the-middle attacks? Not easy. The key is stored on the phone. The key is also encrypted. How to access it? By reversing the app but it has a huge cost. What if we copy data across devices? They must be the same (model, OS, IMEI). We can copy the app + data but it’s not easy for a mass scale attack. The xposed framework helps to clone the device but it requires root access. Root detection is implemented in many apps. Slawomir performed a life demo: He copied data between two mobile phones using shell scripts and was able to make a payment with the cloned device. Note that the payments were performed on the same network and with small amounts of money. Google and banks have strong fraud detection systems. What about the Google push messages used by the application? Cloned devices received both messages but not always (not reliable). Then Slawomir talked about CDCVM which is a verification method that asks the user to give a PIN code but where… on its own device! Some apps do not support it but there is an API and it is possible to patch the application and enable the support (setting it to “True”) via an API call. What about other applications? As usual, some are good while others are bad (ex: some don’t event implement root detection). To conclude, can we prevent cloning? Not completely but we can make the process more difficult. According to Slawomir, the key is also to improve the backend and strong fraud detection controls (ex: based on the behaviour of the user). [Slawomir’s slides are available here]

After the lunch time, my choice was to attend Long Liu’s and Linan Has’s (which was not present) talk. The abstract looked nice: exploitation of the Chakracore core engine. This is a Javascript engine developed by Microsoft for its Edge browser. Today the framework is open source. Why is it a nice target according to the speaker? The source code is freely available, Edge is a nice attack surface. Long explained the different bug they found in the code and they helped them to win a lot of hacking contests. The problem was the monotonous voice of the speaker which just invited to take a small nap. The presentation ended with a nice demo of a web page visited by Edge and popping up a notepad running with system privileges. [Long’s slides are available here]

After the break, I switched to the track four to attend two small talks. But the quality was there! The first one by Patrick Wardle: “Meet and Greet with the MacOS Malware Class of 2016“. The presentation was a cool overview of the malware that targeted the OSX operating system. Yes, OSX is also targeted by malware today! For each of them, he reviewed:

  • The infection mechanism
  • The persistence mechanism
  • The features
  • The disinfection process

The examples covered by Patrick were:

  • Keranger
  • Keydnap
  • FakeFileOpener
  • Mokes
  • Komplex

He also presented some nice tools which could increase the security of your OSX environment. [Patrick’s slides are available here]

The next talk was presented by George Chatzisofroniou and covered a new wireless attach technique called Lure10. Wireless automatic association is not new (the well-known KARMA attack). This technique exists for years but modern operating systems implemented controls against this attack. But MitM attacks remains interesting because most applications do not implement countermeasures. In Windows 10, open networks are not added to the PNL (“Preferred Networks List”).  Microsoft developed a Wi-Fi Sense feature. The Lure10 attack tries to abuse it by making the Windows Location Service think that it is somewhere else and then mimic a Wifi Sence approved local network. In this case, we have an automatic association. A really cool attack that will be implemented in the next release of the wifiphisher phisher framework.  [George’s slides are available here]

My next choice was to attend a talk about sandboxing: “Shadow-Box: The Practical and Omnipotent Sandbox” by Seunghun Han. In short, Shadow-box is a lightweight hypervisor-based kernel protector. A fact: Linux kernels are everywhere today (computers, IoT, cars, etc). The kernel suffers from vulnerabilities and the risk of rootkits is always present. The classic ring (ring 0) is not enough to protect against those threats. Basically, the rootkit changes the system calls table and divert them to it to perform malicious activities.The idea behind Shadow-box is to use the VT technology to help in mitigating those threats. This is called “Ring -1”. Previous researches were already performed but suffered from many issues (mainly performance). The new research insists on lightweight and practical usage. Seunghun explained in detail how it works and ended with a nice demo. He tried to start a rootkit into a Linux kernel that has the Shadow-box module loaded. Detection was immediate and the rootkit not installed. Interesting but is it usable on a day-to-day basis? According to Seunghun, it is. The performance impact on the system is acceptable. [Seughun’ slides are available here]

The last talk of the day focused on TrendMicro products: “I Got 99 Trends and a # is All of Them! How We Found Over 100 RCE Vulnerabilities in Trend Micro Software” by Roberto Suggi Liverani and Steven Seeley. They research started after the disclosure of vulnerabilities. They decided to find more. Why Trendmicro? Nothing against the company but it’s a renowned vendor, they have a bug bounty program and they want to secure their software. The approach followed was to compromise the products without user interaction. They started with low-handing fruits, focused on components like libraries, scripts. The also use the same approach as used in malware analysis: check the behaviour and communications with external services and other components. They reviewed the following products:

  • Smart Protection Server
  • Data Loss Prevention
  • Control Manager
  • Interscan Web Security
  • Threat Discovery Appliance
  • Mobile Security for Enterprise
  • Safesync for Enterprise

The total amount of vulnerabilities they found was so impressive, most of them led to remote code execution. And, for most of them, it was quite trivial. [Roberto’s & Steven’s slides are available here]

This is the end of day #1. Stay tuned for more tomorrow.

 

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